Abstract: Some authors contend that interdependence is low or declining, others that interdependence is high or increasing. The present essay, offering new data on trade, investment, financial, and political sectors, seeks to draw a trial balance between such views and to show that: (1) some significant forms of economic interdependence have grown since 1913; (2) the political importance of economic interdependence has increased greatly since World War I; (3) further increases in positive interdependence among nations can be no means be taken for granted. Present uncertainty and instability is caused by the disproportion between the highly intricate and complex operation of the international economic and financial sector and the relatively rudimentary and inchoate apparatus of intergovernmental cooperation.
against it.' The resultant of these theoretical vectors remains uncertain. In this essay we hope to offer new data and to provide a modest reconciliation of the contending claims, drawing a trial balance between them.
One of the problems in unravelling disagreements about interdependence is the absence of an agreed definition of the term. At least three different notions have been employed. In its most general sense, interdependence suggests a relationship of interests such that if one nation's position changes, other states will be affected by that change." A second meaning, derived from economics, suggests that interdenendence is present when there is an increased national "sensitivity" to external economic development^.^ This "sensitivity" presumably can either be perceived or unperceived.' The most stringent definition romes from Kenneth Waltz, who argues that interdependence entails a relationship that would be costly to break.' This definition is different from the others in two senses: (I) It presumes a positive relationship between the interdependent units, such that each will suffer if the relationship is harmed; (2) relationships in which one party is affected hv what another does would not necessarily be interdependent by Waltz's definition, because the effect might not be "costly." Since observers use such different definitions of the central term, it is easy to understand why they draw different conclusions about the presence or absence of interdependence in the contemporary world.
At the same time, Waltz's conclusion that interdependence is low or declining can be disputed even on the basis of the stringent definition he employs. The Waltz contentions run approximately as follows: Interdependence exists where there is a division of labor or a specialization of functions. Unlike units perform different functions or offer specialized services; they become interdependent when they perform these services for each other and when units come to rely on such s~ecialization. On the other hand, if units are alike, they cannot offer different commodities or services; interdependence declines. Waltz See Keohane and Nye (fn. 4); Kindleberger (fn. 3). This meaning is close to that suggested by Morse and Young. Morse writes: "Interdependent behavior may be understood in terms of the outcome of specified actions of two or more parties (individuals, governments, corporations, etc.) See Waltz (fn. 3), 205-7. also asserts that interdependence is lowest where like units have unequal capacities: Then, powers either cannot or do not have to take each other into account. As juridically like units, therefore, states can have little interdependence at any time and place. Since differences in de facto capacities among states have grown since World War 11, interdependence is now at a nadir. This is not dismaying, however, for it is contended to be a "mistaken conclusion" that "a growing closeness of interdependence would improve the chances of peace."1° To summarize this argument, interdependence is high where there are (I) unlike units; and (2) where the units are relatively equal in capacity.
A number of comments can be offered in rejoinder. First, if interdependence is taken entirely in the positive sense (where interests of states vary directly, not inversely), it is difficult to understand how a high degree of interdependence could be a cause for conflict. If relationships really were costly to break on all sides, this would be a factor for general international cooperation. Second, while it is true that interdependence may be high where there are unlike units involved in the relationship, it is by no means clear that such differentiation is the necessary condition of high interdependence. A most important form of interdependence, that of military alliance, arises when states offer the same defense resources to each other. By pooling their resources, they gain a joint security that each could not attain in isolation, and yet there is no necessary division of labor. Clearly such defense ties might be very costly to break."
If military allies have relationships that are positively interdependent, enemies or adversaries manifest a high degree of negative interdependence in their relationships. Their interests are crucially linked in that it is assumed that if one improves his position, the other suffers. Yet, where such a high degree of interdependence (albeit negative) exists, there is no necessary differentiation of functions or division of labor. Rather, the interdependence of antagonists arises in part because rivals are alike: they compete for the same goals, utilize similar techniques, and seek to win over the same allies or to acquire the same real estate. The very continuance of competition over time, moreover, is likely to make them even more alike. Eventually, rivals may even develop certain positively interdependent goals. If they reside at the top of a hierarchy of nations, it may be a common interest to prevent any in- roads on their joint position by other states. If war is likely to result in widespread mutual devastation, they may have a common interest in mutual accommodation and coexistence.
It may also be argued that the greatest interdependency in contemporary world politics subsists among the most highly developed powers, powers whose economic systems bear the greatest similarity to each other. In military terms, these powers could hurt each other grievously; in economic terms, they have the capacity to help or harm each other. At this juncture, the error of following the comparativeadvantage, product-specialization argument too far is clearly portrayed. The basis for international trade today is not only marked product differentiation, but also the capacity of the domestic market. Europeans, Americans, and Japanese sell the bulk of their goods in each other's markets, even though typical approaches to comparative advantage would have them import raw materials from and sell industrial goods to the less developed countries.12 The products which major industrial countries offer are not highly differentiated in the Ricardian sense; they all offer automobiles, consumer electronics, and industrial equipment. Differences exist, however, in marketing, pricing, quality, and sophistication. As we shall see later, the exchange of manufactured goods for manufactured goods is becoming more typical in international trade, not less so. It therefore does not follow that interdependence is low today, even if Waltz's strict definition of the term is employed.
At the same time, Waltz correctly points to the fact that nationalism and national interests are not secondary or obsolete phenomena in the contemporary world. Indeed, nationalism is a far more prominent factor in economic and political arrangements today than it was in the halcyon days of the nineteenth century. Prior to 1914, economic internationalism was the order of the day. Passports were unnecessary. Tariffs had only been recently reintroduced. National secrecy in military plans and the demand for patriotic loyalty on the part of citizens were surely less stringent than they are now. Nationalism was in fact strengthened by the reformist orientation of modern politics: Franklin Roosevelt, a domestic reformer who tried to put the United States on the road to economic recovery after the Depression, did so at the expense of the international economic and, to some extent, political system. When governments are expected to regulate the economy to 12This approach is that of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem emphasizing factor proportions.
obtain maximum welfare for their citizens, they must often slight the interests of economic and political partners. Citizens may also reflect such attitudes. They do not look to the international system for economic and political benefits, but to their national government. Socialism, nationalization, and domestic economic planning interpose national criteria on international economic forces. By almost any definition of the terms, economic and political nationalism have grown since the last decades of the nineteenth century. What effect has this development had upon interdependence ?
By all three definitions, nationalism might have been expected to reduce interdependence. It might be argued that, if nations seek only to achieve their own goals without any reference to the rest of the system, the linkage between units must decline. If nationalistic goals depend on supportive actions by other members of the international community, however, nationalism cannot be achieved in isolation. Not only does interdependence not decline in such circumstances, aggressive nationalism may lead to higher negative interdependence. The greater nationalism of the twentieth century therefore need not entail a reduction of interdependence. We still do not know whether interdependence will rise or fall, whether it will be positive or negative. The rest of this paper will be devoted to an answer to these questions in economic and political terms, considering data and developments of the past century.13
If we are to gain a greater understanding of present-day interdependence, the trade sector is critical. One of the long-standing contentions of those who assert that interdependence is low or declining is that national industrialization, at least in its later stages, involves a decreasing reliance upon foreign trade. the ratio of foreign trade to GNP over time.14 They concluded that the ratio of foreign trade to GNP increased during the early stages of economic development, but decreased in the later stages of national industrialization.
It is not certain, however, that Deutsch's and Eckstein's data support their conclusions. Ratios for the I~~o ' s , as given by the two investigators, are sometimes quite close to the highest of the series for several countries.15 Moreover, the Deutsch-Eckstein study is based on current dollar figures.'' Over the last century, domestic rates of inflation have tended to inflate GNP figures while, due to revolutionary advances in transportation, export and import prices have not risen as sharply.'' Robert E. Lipsey, therefore, recalculated the ratio of American exports to GNP in constant 1913 dollars. As Table I shows, there is no secular trend of a decline in foreign-trade ratios.
Calculations on other bases support the same conclusion. 16There are no criteria by which to decide which ratio of foreign trade to GNP is more valid, the one based on current dollars or the one based on constant dollars. In its limiting case, the ratio based on current dollars would go to zero, and it would be irrelevant to point out that in constant dollars there was still some foreign trade of consequence. (We are indebted to Richard N. Cooper for this point.) However, in the Deutsch-Eckstein case, where even in current dollars the ratio for the 1950's was relatively high, it is more illuminating to look at ratios based on constant dollars.
The following 
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estimates "tend to understate the subsistence sector of the ec~nomy."~" They accurately point out that much of the growth in GNP in industrialized states is due to the growth of the service sector, and that that very sector was substantially underestimated in GNP calculations for the previous century. It is therefore very difficult to square the available data with the conclusion that foreign trade as a share of GNP has declined as a consequence of higher industrialization.
Changes in the structure of trade, however, may lead to lower interdependence even though the foreign stake of many developed countries is high or increasing. If interdependence existed only when the relationship would be costly to break, it might be contended that trade at the turn of the century was more truly interdependent than it is today. Before World War I, a typical trade transaction probably involved an exchange of manufactured goods for raw materials; today, much of world trade consists of the exchange of manufactured goods among developed countries. Since these countries could theoretically adopt programs of import replacement, it is contended that interdependence has decreased."
It is indeed true that trade in manufactured goods has greatly increased with time. Table 3 shows the trend in world exports of primary products, petroleum, and manufactured goods since 1950. While primary exports have almost doubled and petroleum exports nearly trebled, manufacturing exports have grown by a factor of seven. These trends are reinforced by Table 4 , which shows that raw materials have dropped and manufactured goods have risen as a percentage of imports and exports among developed countries since 1954.
The increasing trade in manufactured goods, not surprisingly, is linked with an increase in the trade among developed countries. Table  5 shows that trade among industrial states has increased most dramatically in the last three-decades. These trends are consistent with the conclusion that interdependence has not increased, however; industrial countries, with flexible economies, should be able to reduce their dependence upon each other without great cost. But this argument must take account of yet another See Waltz (fn. 3), 210. Table 6 shows the change in Gini coefficients for selected It is noteworthy that among developed countries (with the exception of imports to Japan) the changes are all in a positive direction, indicating that trade has become more geographically concentrated among suppliers and markets with time. For the developing countries shown, with the exception of Turkey, trade has become less concentrated geographically, and therefore it reflects a smaller degree of dependence. Table 7 gives similar evidence of the dependence on trade in particular commodities. With the exception of changes in imports for France and the United Kingdom, commodity concentration for the major developed countries has increased in the past decade: Developed countries are now more dependent upon the import and export of particular commodities than they were previously. Developing countries show no such pattern, and Mexico's reduction of dependence on particular commodity imports and exports is striking. These findings modify conclusions about a reduction in interdependence among industrial countries. The concentration in trade among developed countries is growing. Diversification of suppliers and markets is harder to accomplish. To this degree,
dependence and a mutual interdependence of all industrial countries has in~reased.'~ There is a further point. The most satisfactory measure of interdependence is not the cost of breaking the relationship, but the degree to which economic interests are direct functions of one another. If the economic position of state A changes, will state B be affected? In the nineteenth century, there was a de facto interdependence of economic units, but political governors did not act in such a way as to maximize the economic interests of their unit. They therefore neglected external economic changes that had a great effect upon the domestic economic system. During the past half-century, political changes within society have made it impossible for political leaders to ignore the domestic impact of external economic forces. Today, therefore, they respond vigorously to external economic changes. Economic effects are now fully comprehended within the political realm. Thus, politically significant interdependence is much higher today than it was during the nineteenth century.
The investment sector reveals similar patterns. Those who argue that interdependence is decreasing can point to the change in ;he pattern of overseas investment overthe century.30 Those who assert that it is rising can center their attention on the tremendous recent growth in foreign investment and on changing patterns of investment.31 Much of the growth in foreign investment since World War I1 has been in direct investment (investment which results in an im-29 On balance, the foreign-trade sector does not appear to be quite as useful for the measurement of relative interdependence as previous analysts have maintained. Although foreign trade is increasing relatively and absolutely among developed countries, that trade represents an exchange of manufactured goods. As a number of economists have pointed out, if governments can find substitutes for import or export markets among a few industrial countries, the growing effects of concentration do not necessarily increase interdependence. But even if substitutability exists economically, the problems of the political costs of switching from one market to the other and of the circumscription of political latitude involved in the process remain. 3OKenneth Waltz notes, for example, that "in 1910, the value of total British investment abroad was 1% times larger than her national income"; for the United States today, however, it is a meager 18%. Waltz (fn. 3), 215.
a1 See Cooper (fn. 4), chaps. 3, 4, and 5; Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes" (fn. 4)7 36-37. portant share of ownership or control of a foreign corporation). By contrast, the leading authority on capital flows in the late nineteenth century observes that "portfolio investment was a far more important component of long-term capital movements before 1914 than direct investment; and it consisted much more of transactions in bonds and other debt instruments than in equitie~."'~ What direct investment there was in the nineteenth century tended to proceed from capitalabundant to capital-deficient areas." While one-third of British longterm investments were in Europe, much of this was in capital-deficient areas such as Russia. Even when direct investment in other developed countries increased after World War I, investment in capital-deficient areas remained a large fraction of the total. In this period, American direct investment abroad typically flowed to Latin America.
The recent growth in overseas long-term investment has not only taken the form of direct investment, it has also increasingly gone to other Table 8 indicates this concentration. The conclusion to be drawn from these trends is that the stake of the developed countries, and particularly of the United States, in the international economic system has risen as it has become more concentrated." Direct investments imply a higher stake in a foreign country than portfolio investments. Investments in manufacturing enterprises and in other developed countries have narrowed the focus of American investor activity and concern. More is at stake in specific markets, and in specific kinds of enterprises; there is more to lose than there was formerly.
The absolute increase in American direct foreign investment is matched by its relative growth as compared to other GNP indicators. Measured against domestic GNP, in current or constant dollars, the foreign-investment sector has grown rapidly. This tremendous growth in the book value of American direct investment has been paralleled by a growth in the volume of operations of foreign affiliates compared with U.S. domestic concerns." Domestic sales did not double between 1957 and 1968; however, the sales of foreign manufacturing affiliates rose by more than a factor of three. In 1968, the volume of sales abroad in manufacturing amounted to 10 per cent of domestic sales in manufacturing.
Foreign earnings on direct investments of American corporations have also increased more rapidly than domestic earnings. Since 1950, domestic profits of corporations have risen by about 50 per cent. But earnings on direct foreign investments have increased by more than 450 per cent.40 By 1969, foreign earnings on direct investments had risen to 28 per cent of domestic earnings4' This increased preoccupation with the foreign economic sector, moreover, was not confined to the United States. The growth of the multinational corporation has been so spectacular that today, "of the 50 largest economic entities (in the world), 37 are countries and 13 are corporations. Of the top 100, 51 are corporation^."^^ It has been estimated that about one-quarter of the gross national product of the non-Communist world is earned by the business of such enterprises outside their home c~untries."~ It is of course true that foreign investment as a percentage of national income has decreased since 1913, but the type of investment which has occurred is such as to give its owner a substantial stake in the foreign sector. In contrast to the experience of the nineteenth century, current foreign investment is not simply credit, it is partial ownership. Control of productive facilities is involved. Today, transfers of technology are an exceedingly important part of direct investment. Since they are so important, it would be foolhardy for host countries to threaten them. But if the cost of breaking the relationship is so high, interdependence must also be high.
The political significance of interdependence is low when its salience is low. In 1913, economic interdependence had very low political salience; governments were not supposed to be responsive to or control external economic influences. Thus, the absolute high value of invest-39 See Table F The financial operation of the international economic system has changed greatly since World War I. Under the gold standard of 1880-1913, short-term capital movements were neither as extensive nor as disruptive as they have been in recent years.44 The amount of funds available for "hot money" flows has now reached an all-time high.
Table H of the Appendix shows that $71 billion is available in various currencies (mainly dollars) for short-term transactions. This huge pool of assets, sloshing from country to country, can easily undermine domestic monetary policy and strength. In 1968, an inflow of foreign funds into West Germany amounted to as much as 8.9 per cent of the domestic money supply, greatly circumscribing attempts at an antiinflationary policy. In the same year, France suffered an outflow of 22 per cent of her international reserves, forcing her central bank to put a brake on expansionist policies.45 In July 1972, speculation against the dollar was so intense that in just one day European central banks bought $1.5 billion to prevent the dollar from going beneath the level fixed by the Smithsonian Agreement of December 18, 1971.~~ Less than 14 months later, speculation forced a further 10 per cent devaluation of the dollar, and in one day Germany took in $2.7 billion in exchange for marks. The Smithsonian Agreement, which once appeared to be a long-term solution, has now been abandoned.
If the sudden speculative movements of this vast pool of currencies are not to undermine domestic monetary stability and economic progress, and perhaps to cause a collapse of the whole Western trading system, governments will have to concert their countermeasures. Increasing recognition of the problem in the past fifteen years has led to the General Agreement to Borrow (GAB), various currency-swap arrangements, an enlargement of IMF quotas, and the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR's). Yet it is by no means certain that these and various pending arrangements will fully control the shortterm flow of funds among Western and developed nations. The inter-dependence of the financial structure of trade is growing, but still higher cooperation among governments is necessary to ensure that it will not become a negative interdependen~e.~~ Other changes have transformed the system since World War I. The old gold standard was based (not surprisingly) on gold as a medium of exchange. Minimum use was made of foreign currencies as reserves. At the end of 1913, the nations of the world held only $963 million in foreign-exchange reserves, and over half of these were possessed by Russia, India, and Japan."Wfficial gold holdings, in contrast, were more than five times as much.49 With the move to a gold-exchange standard, the percentage of national reserves accounted for by foreignexchange holdings has gone up dramatically. Table I These figures are even more instructive when analyzed in conjunction with the growth of world trade in the same years. In 1945, world exports in the non-Communist world totaled $34.2 billion. By the end of 1971, world exports were estimated at $334 billion, 977 per cent of the previous figure. This means that since 1945, the value of world exports has more than doubled every eight years. This growth is more than double the growth rate of foreign-exchange holdings, more than four times that of total international reserves, and almost eight times the growth rate of gold holdings. In 1945, total international reserves were 39 per cent greater than the value of world exports; by the end of 1971, total international reserves were only 40 per cent of the total value of exports in one year. Thus, while the holdings of international reserves have not kept pace with the growth in trade, the degree to which they have kept up is due to vast increases in the holdings of foreign exchange.
See Susan Strange, "The Dollar Crisis: 1971," International Affairs, XLVIII (April 1972), 194. 48 See Bloomfield (fn. 32), 7.
49 Ibid., 7. Peter Lindert disputes the traditional wisdom (and Arthur Bloomfield) by claiming that foreign currencies were used fairly extensively. However, even Lindert's data for 1913 show that only $1132 million were held in foreign-exchange reserves, which is 15.9% of the total world reserves. He also concurs that more than half of these official foreign balances were held in Russia, India, and Japan. See Peter H. Lindert, Key Currencies and Gold, zgoo-zgzj (Princeton Studies in International Fi-This change also represents an increase in international interdependence. Gold was an undifferentiated asset; it could be earned from any sector, and spent in any sector. A nation had to discipline its trade overall, but not with specific countries. Today, bilateral trading relationships are far more important, and among those trading countries interdependence has increased. What is more important, while the countries whose currencies are media of exchange have some responsibility for disciplining their own financial policies, other countries also have a direct financial stake in their solvency. These other countries have an interest in not allowing reserve currencies to sink too low on international exchanges. Hence the rescue operations for the British pound and the U.S. dollar. Now that Swiss francs, German marks, and Japanese yen are being held as reserves, other nations also have a stake in maintaining the value of such reserves. These currencies may be able to benefit from rescue operations at a later stage. Gold holdings in the nineteenth century did not produce this same stake, this same interdependence. Governments, recognizing this dependence upon currencies, have now gone so far as to create a new reserve unit, the SDR, the use and further extension of which will be entirely dependent upon international agreement. The interdependence of the financial system has now become formal.
The development of political relations among states since 1913 has witnessed two major trends. Between 1919 and 1939, an essentially autarchic trend held sway, with nations striving to reduce their dependence upon others, first in political and later in economic terms. Because of the role of prewar alliances, World War I strengthened the tendency for nations to rely on themselves. The peacetime alignments which emerged in the thirties had little significance in time of crisis or war. Indeed, the only major powers which stood by their alliance commitments were Germany and Japan. The Soviet Union, France, Britain, and Italy all vacillated, and the United States remained out of the bargaining.
After World War 11, however, nations came to believe that they could not ensure their own defense without help. National selfsufficiency would no longer provide security. In the wake of Hiroshima, many nations also concluded that major wars would be so horrendous that they could not be tolerated at all. Henceforth, minimal cooperation would be necessary even among adversaries. Arrangements were made for crisis communication and management.
In recent years, however, intergovernmental cooperation and interdependence have grown apart from military stimuli. It can even be argued that the alienation of publics from their governors has strengthened such trends. Contemporary government depends upon such a wealth of information and specialized expertise that the man in the street cannot keep up with what is happening, to say nothing of being able to make informed judgments. Under these circumstances, elections have come to be symbolic processes, largely devoid of intellectual content. Since people do not fully understand their governments, they tend to distrust them and to become resentful toward those in authority. But distrust of those in power nationally does not lead to any new foci of international loyalty and support. If national bureaucracies are immobile, international or supranational institutions are either weak or unresponsive to popular demands. Even in Europe there has been no marked substitution of international for national loyalties.
The difficulties of domestic governance have, paradoxically, forced governmental elites together. Although the masses cannot fully communicate with elites, and elites cannot talk to the masses except in the simplest terms, elites can talk to each other. National leaders are coming to recognize that, with individual variations, they are all in the same boat. Among developed societies at least, they face similar problems: the problem of remaining in power as the electorate becomes sullen and resentful; the problems of economic progress and of making their way in international politics while avoiding major war. Leader-toleader diplomacy has been a way of learning from each other.
The failure of ideology to cope with real governmental problems has also brought leaders together. The barrage of information and the communications revolution have today either destroyed or rendered irrelevant most ideological systems of belief." Rigid doctrinal approaches are discredited by new information. Rulership requires so much expertise and detailed adjustment that ideological systems offer few guidelines. Elites learn from each other, perhaps more than they do from their own publics; in one sense they help each other solve the problem of domestic governance.
Increased communication among leaders has not, however, put an end to nationalism. It is true, as Kenneth Waltz argues, that "the progress of internal integration and the increased intervention of governments in their domestic economies means that for most states the internal sector now looms larger than it once did."" While elites are looking outward, publics are turning to their national governments for the solution of social and economic problems. What Karl Kaiser calls "vertical interaction" (between government and society) has grown greatly in recent decades. Kaiser argues that "a high degree of horizontal interaction [between units of world politics] . . . does not lead to transnational politics unless there is vertical interaction." He goes on: "The higher the degree of interventionism on the part of national governments, the more vulnerable governmental policies become to processes on the level of transnational society which might thwart these policies. A democratic structure intensifies this relationship since it forces governments to be more responsive to disturbance^."^^ He then concludes that a nation-state's participation in transnational politics is a function of the product of horizontal and vertical interaction:
This equation suggests that, if vertical interaction increased and horizontal interaction remained the same, transnational politics would increase. But if transnational politics is any measure of the amount of interdependence among states, this conclusion can scarcely be accepted. If vertical integration and interaction were to increase greatly, as for example with the establishment of a totalitarian state, transnational politics would almost certainly decline rather than increase. Such an increase in vertical interaction would probably stimulate a decline in horizontal interaction with other states and societies, again preventing any increase in transnationalism. It is also not an accident that states convulsed by revolutionary impulses have been the least amenable to horizontal interaction with other states and societies. The domestic preoccupation of the vertical revolutionary process tends to cut links with other units. It is also not surprising that the Communist countries, with the highest degree of vertical integration, where "the permanent intervention of governmental institutions in the social and economic life of society" has gone farthest, evince the fewest horizontal ties with other states and societies. There can be no conclusion, therefore, that vertical interaction always increases transnational politics and interdependence. The earth is today poised between a world of nationalism and a world of transnationalism. The vertical interaction of nationalist processes has moved to a new peak. The horizontal interaction of transnational processes is higher than at any point since World War I. Moreover, it is growing rapidly. As both Kaiser and Morse have pointed vertical interaction has made horizontal interaction relevant for political and governmental purposes. If vertical interaction were not so great, the world would be witnessing a return to the apolitical interdependence of 1913. However, a rapid further increase in domestic social change and vertical interaction, far from increasing transnational politics, could put an end to them.
Domestic governments lie at the nexus of vertical and horizontal interaction. They are impelled in one direction by the desire to satisfy the electorate and to build domestic support. They are impelled in another by the high degree of horizontal integration of the system. If they are to cope with the great transnational phenomena of the current age-the multinational corporation, the unrivaled impact of private financial transfers, and continuing trade problems-they must cooperate with one another. In some measure the two influences are complementary: If governments are to satisfy the demands of the electorate in economic and financial policies, they may have to cooperate more fully with other nations. Under the stimulus of economic nationalism, however, nations may also occasionally act against the multilateral cooperative framework.
Intergovernmental cooperation has slowly increased since World War I1 to provide for a steadily increasing level of international trade and financial stability. The gold pool, GAB, and swap arrangements were the achievements of the early sixties. SDR's and last-minute rescue operations for the dollar or the pound are the remedies of today. Yet, given the huge pool of Eurodollars and other currencies which can spill in or out of the domestic economic reservoirs of Western states, it is by no means assured that intergovernmental cooperation will be great enough to meet the need. Devaluation has often been the practical recourse, even though it represents national action against an agreed set of currency values.
American economic nationalism stimulated the U.S. moves of August 15, 1971 and February 12, 1973 . The first eventually led to the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971, but that agreement could not be maintained under the continued pressure of monetary speculation. A further 10 per cent devaluation of the dollar, on February 12, 1973, led to the float of European and Japanese currencies. Even after the second American devaluation, however, the dollar and a number of other currencies remained vulnerable to speculative assault. After each autarchic move, the damage to the ~e s i e r n trading mechanism has been patched or repaired. But it is not certain that intergovernmental cooperation will be great enough to meet all crises in the future. It is, for example, uncertain that the Common Market countries will be able to keep their currencies in fixed alignment under current pressures. Neither is it certain that the Europeans will be able to avoid import surcharges if their currencies float too high for domestic political acceptability. In this sense, the American precedent of August 1971 may now be employed by European states. The problem of speculative flows of hot money has by no means been solved.55
Today, therefore, whether interdependence will emerge as positive or negative will depend largely on old-fashioned cooperation among governments. Governments can heed nationalistic, autarchic, or reformist demands of the citizenry. Even if they do not do so, however, the onrush of economic transnationalism is so rapid that it is not certain that governments can keep abreast of it. When antiquated forms of cooperation fail, nationalistic alternatives may be substituted.
In the international system today there is a phenomenon akin to Ernst Haas's "spill-over" in the Common Market. Nations that strive to carry out existing functions required by the exigencies of transnational flows and domestic demands must move to a higher level of cooperation. Horizontal interaction is increasing so rapidly, however, that the past apparatus of intergovernmental institutions and policy is no longer adequate. Haas presumed that, within an already partially integrated structure, this would lead to further integration of policies and institutions. Whatever the mandates of functional cooperation within customs unions, however, the international system as a whole does not prescribe such results. The failure to meet the challenge of higher necessary cooperation could mean a higher possibility of conflict. The objectives at stake are much greater than heretofore, but it is not certain that the current structure of interdependence will permit them to be achieved. 1968 1936 , 1950 , 1959 , AND 1936 1950 1959 1968 Mining and Smelting 15.4 9.6 9.6 8. Profits: 1950 -1962 : Survey of Cuwent Business, September 1965 1962 -1963 : ibid., July 1966 1 9 6~: ibid., July 1968, 24; 1965 -1966 : ibid., July 1969 1967 : ibid., July 1971 August 1962, 22-23; 1961 : ibid., August 1963 1962 : ibid., August 1964 1963 : ibid., October 1971 . " Estimated quarterly data expressed as annual rate.
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